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The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization
Hans
Globalization, the Fall of the Iron Curtain and Factor Price Convergence
The fall of the Iron Curtain was an unparalleled shock to Western economies in general and Europe in particular. Suddenly the 28% of mankind who previously had lived in the Communist states began to participate in the market game in the same way as the 15% OECD people had done before. And, coincidentally, India has now also decided to participate, which increases the new entrants into the world market economy to 45%.
While this development is likely to produce gains from trade for most countries involved and substantially raise the standard of living of a substantial part of mankind, it is not without problems for the West. The main difficulty is the process of factor price convergence. Gains from trade always accompany the process of price and wage convergence, because the original differences in prices and wages initiate the arbitrage and specialization processes that are the reason for these gains. Thus there will always be groups in society that lose, despite the gains to be achieved in the aggregate.
In theory, assuming no frictions and transportation costs, the aggregate gains from trade reach a maximum when all wages and prices are equal and arbitrage ceases to be profitable. In practice, given the frictions, prices and wages will not and should not become identical. However, given the huge differences that we see today, they will converge over time. For the next half of a century it will hardly make any difference whether the wage convergence between China and the West will eventually lead to equal wages or to wage gaps of, say, 30% as are found among the countries of the West. wages match those of the West. Currently, the average wage cost per hour of the eight east European EU accession countries is 13% of the west German wage cost, for example, and the Chinese wage is only 1/27. Closing the wage gap will be a positive experience for the ex-communist countries, but will involve severe and painful adjustment processes for the West.
Some have downplayed the difficulties by pointing out how easy it was for the EU to manage Western enlargement by Spain and Portugal in the mid 1980s. However, these developments are not comparable, as the two countries were much more advanced than the eastern European countries. Instead of the 13% ratio of the west German wage, their wages stood at 50% at the time of EU accession.
How long will convergence take? Estimates vary. If one believes in the convergence figure of 2% that was found by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), implying a half time of 35 years, east European wages will have reached 50% of German wages by 2035. However, during the last decades, west European convergence has just been 1.1%
p.a. implying a half time of 63 years. If east-west convergence were to proceed at the same speed as the internal convergence in the western part of the EU, the wages of the east European member countries would reach 50% of west Germany's wages by 2054.
The Forces of Factor Price Convergence
There are various economic forces bringing about factor price convergence. The first is the spill-over of technological knowledge. The transfer of scientific knowledge through the scholarly media as well as the transfer through observation and imitation are powerful equalizing forces. It is true that some of this transfer can be prevented by patents and other intellectual property rights. However, as patents usually expire after 30 years, the still backward countries can immediately leapfrog to the state of western knowledge of 30 years ago. Moreover, most of the technological knowledge of this world is not protected, and much knowledge is too diffuse to be patented. When a European company opens a factory in China, there is little to prevent the Chinese to build a nearly identical plant on the green field next door.
The second force is capital flows. Capital moves from high-wage western countries to low-wage eastern countries because the rate of return is higher there. The capital creates jobs in the East and increases the demand for labour there which raises the wage, and the reverse process takes place in the West. Thus wages converge.
Germany is a country which is currently very strongly affected by this process.
At a net investment share of only 2.9% of net domestic product (NDP), it currently ranks lowest among all OECD countries. In 2005, net investment was only 60 billion euros or 40% of aggregate savings which itself stood at 150 billion euros. 60% of German savings, or 90 billion euros, were sent abroad as net capital exports.
The third force is migration. As people migrate from low-wage to high-wage countries, they make labour scarcer in the former and more abundant in the latter, which tends to reduce the international wage differences. In Europe, migration has already been strong in the past decades and, in all likelihood, it will continue to be strong in the Europe is currently facing a mass immigration wave of historical dimensions.
To properly interpret the immigration figures note that they cannot be equated with the shares of foreigners, because the former also reflect the countries' naturalization policies. Where available, the shares of foreigners have also been indicated in the diagram. In the case of the Netherlands, which has a very liberal naturalization policy, this share is only 4.3%, in the case of Germany it is 8.9%. The figures also cannot be equated with the share of the population with a migration background, as the children of the immigrants born in the host country are not included.
In the case of Germany, immigrants-including their children-currently account for 18.5% of its population.
A fourth force of factor price convergence is specialization. As the capital-rich
West encounters new trade possibilities with the low-wage countries of the East, it retreats from labour-intensive production processes and specializes in capital-intensive ones, where labour typically is unskilled labour and capital includes human capital in the sense of skilled labour. Conversely, the East, which is rich in labour, specializes in labour-intensive production. Both specialization processes also tend to reduce the wage gaps, as the demand for unskilled labour in the West falls while it rises in the East. The process has been observable in most EU countries. Practically everywhere has production depth declined in the sense that the share of the manufacturing sector's value added in its own output has fallen.
Due to its geographical and cultural proximity to the East and its own high wages, Germany has been affected particularly strongly. There is hardly any German car whose domestic share in production cost reaches 50%. Even exports as such, 11% in the Netherlands, about 12% in France, 23% in Great Britain, 26% in Japan and 27% in Germany, the dubious OECD champion in this regard.
Gains from Trade and Specialization: Theory and Reality
Despite the obvious hardship resulting from job losses, these losses cannot in themselves be considered a sign of welfare losses for the West. After all, they could be the necessary counterpart of a gradual process of sector shift that normally is associated with gains from trade, specialization and an improved international division of labour.
There could be an equal number of jobs created elsewhere in the economy, compensating for the losses. This at least is the typical economics textbook view.
Unfortunately, however, reality does not always fit the textbook view. One example of where it definitely does not fit is Germany. As shown in Table 1 Rest of the Economy -0.15
Into Non-employment 1.36 Table 1 This development pattern is so remote from what the textbook predicts that it would be absurd to interpret it as an improvement in the international division of labour.
It rather seems to be accompanied by welfare losses. As more and more people stop working, they stop making contributions to GDP and national income. Small wonder that Germany was the European growth laggard in the period under consideration, next to Italy.
While no comparable data for other European countries are available, it may be suspected that the problems described for Germany may also be occurring there. After all, even Western Europe on average had a miserable growth performance during the last ten years. There was no comparable region and no continent in the whole world whose growth performance was similarly disappointing. From 1995 to 2004 the world economy grew by 30%, east Asia grew by 87%, the U.S. by 34%, Latin America by 26% and even Africa grew by 31%, while the old EU countries grew only by 23%.
Rigid Wages and the Welfare State
What went wrong? That is the obvious question one must ask after realising the problematic reactions of the labour market.
The answer is that the European labour market is rigid, impeding the textbook type wage adjustments, and with rigid wages, unemployment results.
The rigidity stems, to some extent, from the strong unions that have not allowed wage reductions despite the fact that the participation of the ex-Communist countries has reduced the equilibrium wage of unskilled labour in Europe. To another extent, it stems from the welfare state that offers generous wage replacement incomes.
All Western European countries, perhaps with the exception of Great Britain and
Ireland, have social systems that are based on the idea of the state paying money in the case no labour income is available. Whether one thinks of social assistance, unemployment compensation or early retirement benefits: the rule is always that the government provides an income under the condition that people do not work and withdraws this income to the extent they do. The government acts as a competitor to private business in the labour market, paying a wage for doing nothing, a replacement wage. This replacement wage creates a minimum wage demand that the private sector must exceed in order to find people who are willing to work. If, however, the labour productivity of the people involved is not high enough to make the employer pay this wage, unemployment results. Evidently, the gradual expansion of replacement incomes as part of the expansion of the welfare state in recent decades contributed significantly to the rise in structural unemployment (Phelps, 1994) . This is a particular problem for the unskilled, whose wage is significantly pushed above the market clearing level by this effect. However, it extends also to more skilled wage categories because certain natural distances between the categories have to be maintained. As a result of replacement incomes, the whole wage distribution is compressed from below like a harmonica held with the left hand and pushed upward with the right. Unemployment is created up to the middle income ranges, though at progressively lower rates. Small wonder that in nearly all EU countries unemployment among the unskilled is higher than that among medium-skill levels, which in turn exceeds that among people with a university education.
Wage rigidity is a clue to understanding the difference between the textbook prediction of gains from trade and the reality of increasing unemployment and also for evaluating the adjustments one can observe.
There are three different conceptual levels from which the structural changes can be assessed. One is the business perspective. From a business point of view, the economic reactions to trade and international wage differences obviously make sense, for otherwise they would not be taken. This is a trivial truth that no one can deny. Take the German automobile industry, for example. Because it can have its parts cheaply produced in Eastern Europe, it manages to stay competitive and make profits.
Another level of judgement is economic second best. Given that the wages are cut in stone and do not react to the forces of globalization, it is probably good that firms react the way they do, because otherwise they would go bankrupt, unable to maintain any employment. Capital deepening and sector shifts towards capital-intensive production, including outsourcing and offshoring the upstream parts of the production chain, are welfare-improving reactions to the forces of globalization when wages cannot be changed. They go along with unemployment, but there would be even more unemployment without these reactions. The last and most important level of judgement is economic first best, and this is the textbook view discussed above, claiming that trade generates gains with all countries involved thanks to an improved international division of labour. This view obviously is not correct for a country like Germany, as was demonstrated above.
In summary, therefore, one can say that the European economy's reactions to international low-wage competition are efficient from the perspective of firms and from an economic second best perspective, given the rigidities of the welfare state, but that these rigidities themselves prevent a first best reaction of the economy.
Pathological Overreactions
Many politicians and even some economists face substantial difficulties when they are Thus both countries gain if the rich countries lend some of their capital to the poor countries, be it for the purpose of investment or for the purpose of consumption smoothing over time.
However, when wages in the rich western countries are kept rigidly above their market clearing levels, the rate of return to capital in these countries is artificially reduced and more than the efficient amount of capital leaves the country, while unemployment increases. There is a pathological capital export (Seidel 2005 ).
Confusingly for the politicians, who are not trained economists, this capital export comes along with a current account surplus, since such a surplus by definition is a capital export. Thus the politicians even applaud the pathological overreaction as a sign of a high competitiveness of the domestic economy.
Things are similar with the specialization effects described above. Consider first horizontal specialization. Suppose the West, rich in human and real capital, opens up trade with the East, which is poor but has an abundance of unskilled labour. As explained above, a natural reaction of the rich countries is to give up some of their labour-intensive sectors so that the factors of production can move to the capitalintensive export sectors where the rich countries have a comparative advantage. As the capital-intensive sectors, by definition, are unable to absorb all the workers released in this process of fully absorbing the real and human capital, the sector shifts in the first instance cause unemployment.
Suppose for a moment the West has well-functioning labour markets with flexible wages. The initial unemployment will then lead to declining wages which themselves incur counter-reactions that ultimately avoid unemployment for two reasons.
For one thing, all sectors switch to more labour intensive production techniques. For another, a brake is imposed on the extent of the sector shifts, as with lower wages a larger part of the labour intensive sectors of the economy is able to survive. The economy reacts efficiently in the manner described in the textbooks.
If, however, we take into account that wages are rigid, these two counterreactions cannot take place, and permanent unemployment will prevail. In particular, the brake on the sector shift, which an efficient economy imposes via declining wages, is not operative. Thus, there is a landslide shift in the economy's sector structure from labour intensive import-competing to capital-intensive export sectors, causing mass unemployment together with a pathological overshooting of value added earned in exports (Sinn 2004 (Sinn , 2006 ).
The process is further reinforced by excessive vertical specialization from labour-intensive upstream to capital-intensive downstream activities, i.e. by the bazaar effect. Again, a flexible economy, whose wages decline following job losses, would also exhibit the bazaar effect to some extent. Production depth would decline and export quantities would increase faster than value added in exports, as described above.
However, the wage decline would help to fine-tune the structural change by again imposing a brake on the development. In the absence of such a decline, with rigid wages, the bazaar effect, too, becomes excessive. Too large a fraction of the upstream value added chains are cut off, and too much capital and labour is moving to the downstream sectors. Thus, value added in exports not only grows too much. What is more, the ratio of export quantities and value added generated in exports expands too quickly. For two reasons the measured export quantities are becoming too large. This is particularly alarming news for a country like Germany, whose exports seem to perform excellently. Germany is number two in world exports of goods and services. In terms of goods exports alone, Germany even ranks first (WTO 2005) . While most observers interpret the excellent German export performance as a sign of competitive strength, the above analysis at least suggests that some caution is appropriate. Germany's growth has been miserable during the last ten years, the country being the laggard of Europe next to Italy, and its standardized unemployment rate has risen from 8.0% to 9.5%. Given that Germany has very high social replacement 
Activating Social Assistance
What is the policy conclusion following from this analysis? Some would say that the welfare state needs to be curtailed in order to reduce the high wage competition it exerts in the labour market so that wages become flexible and the economy is able to react efficiently to the forces of globalization. But that would mean giving up the European dream of an equitable society avoiding crime and social unrest, because it provides useful insurance against the multiple economic risks that the market economy encounters.
A better policy reaction is to improve the welfare state by making its redistributive activities compatible with wage flexibility. In principle, this is not difficult because instead of paying people for staying absent, the state could pay them for participating: it could provide wage subsidies to workers instead of wage replacement incomes. If the state pays wage subsidies, there is no lower bound on wages, as people do not need a wage that compensates for the loss of social benefits. On the contrary, they would be willing to accept very low wages knowing that the subsidy will be paid in addition to these wages, augmenting their incomes. The state's role would be to give people, who are not productive enough to earn a subsistence minimum with their own work, a second income that is tailored to the individual circumstances so as to ensure that the subsistence minimum is not undercut.
The proposal follows the spirit of the American literature on this theme ranging from Haveman (1988) and Solow (1988) to Phelps (1994a Phelps ( , 1994b Phelps ( , 1997 Phelps ( , 2000 .
However it is based on subsidies to individuals rather than their firms. In theory, both approaches lead to similar results when the market has reacted. However, individual subsidies can be tailored more easily to individual circumstances and may therefore be a more efficient tool for targeting the poor.
A practical way of securing the subsistence minimum, inspired by the US This new system is likely to provide the necessary wage flexibility for the unskilled to enable the economy to return to full employment. In the German case, wages for the unskilled are expected to fall by one third, with 3.2 million new jobs being created.
At least in Germany, a further provision of the system is required to ensure that no one who is needy can fall below the subsistence minimum even if he does not find a job in the private economy. This is communal jobs. In case of need, when no private job is found, everyone can demand employment with his local community providing him a wage for a full-time job equal to today's social assistance or Bystand, for that matter.
That is a wage of 600 euros in the Dutch case and 670 euros in the German case.
One may wonder how the local community could meaningfully employ all the people who might be coming. But the simple answer is loan labour. The community can use the private loan labour business, which is already well developed in the Netherlands, and lease its labour force to the private sector at a fee that is determined by supply and demand. And for sure, there will be a fee above zero, at which the bulk of the people who came to the communities can be leased successfully to private employers.
Augmented by communal loan labour contracts, the system offers two ways of wage subsidization. A direct way, where people themselves find employment in the private sector, and an indirect way, where they are employed in the private sector by the aid of local communities and loan employment firms. The incentive structure is designed such that the first way is preferable. Despite the cut of the basic social assistance level, people can earn an overall income equal to the previous level of social assistance by working half-time in the private sector, and they can earn more than that by working more than half-time. If they rely on communal jobs, they have to work fulltime for the same income.
Overall, Activating Social Assistance is a water-tight new polder system that both respects the social aims of the European welfare state and the needs of a market economy that struggles to survive the international low-wage competition brought about by globalization.
The old welfare state based on the idea of paying wage replacement incomes has come to its historical end. It represents an experiment of history that failed because it produced mass unemployment. It is becoming more and more obvious in these times how utopian that system really is. There is no way it can be maintained despite the forces of international factor price convergence. The new welfare system that provides people a state income while they work is the better alternative. Help for participating instead of for staying away is the new slogan.
